recognized by so-called "interpretationist" accounts of meaning and content which emphasize this normative dimension. But this conditional normativity rests in turn upon another kind of ascription, ascription of meaning and thoughts to oneself, or self-ascriptions.
I.CATEGORICAL VS RELATIONAL NORMATIVITY
To say that the question whether meaning or mental content is normative is unclear is an understatement. We may formulate it in the following way If we raise these familiar questions about linguistic meaning and thought contents, the claim that they have a normative dimension seems to amount to asking whether judgments to the effect that an individual means something by an expression, or thinks a particular thought implies normative judgments of the form :
(1) If X means that P, then X ought to (should, has a reason to, etc) mean that … (2) If X thinks that P, then X ought to (should, have reason to, etc.) think that … With respect to meanings, judgments of the form (1) are often framed as judgments to the effect that words and expressions in a natural language are attached to particular rules of usage, or as judgments to the effect that there are particular holistic connexions between meanings. For instance it is said that if it is rule of English that "cat" means cat , then one ought to comply with this rule, or that one ought to recognize that cats are animals. Similarly with thoughts. For instance, it seems that if one believes that cats are furred, one ought to believe that some animals are furred. But such claims, as it is often noticed, are not obvious. (1) and (2) seem to say that the normativity of meaning or thought somewhat resides in them categorically, as a real property of meanings and thoughts, which prevents any factual account of the entities in question. But rules of meaning, as other kinds of rules, although they are often expressed by statements which contain normative terms, do not necessarily imply that these statements express normative judgments, which fall short of being descriptive or factual. For instance the rule "In Britain one should drive on the left" contains a normative term, but it does record a fact about British drivers. Similarly something is a thermometer if it is accurate or inaccurate, but this does not imply that we cannot account for it in factual or descriptive terms.
We need not, however, charge the theorists who maintain that meaning and thought are normative for being committed to such dubious assumptions. They do not mean that the rules of a natural language or the existence of thoughts and concepts do not record factual regularities. Neither do they mean that the rules registrate a special variety of facts, normative facts. What they mean, rather, is that the interpretation of these rules or of these thoughts obeys certain correctness conditions, and that these conditions do not record further facts about their application. For instance when Crispin Wright says:
"Meaning is normative. To know the meaning of an expression is to know, perhaps unreflectively, how to appraise uses of it; it is to know a set of constraints to which correct use conform" 2 he is actually saying that the normativity of meaning is attached to the "constaints" to which correct use should be in conformity with. To know the constraints is to know how to interpret the particular rules. But whereas the rules and uses of words and concepts are responsive to facts, the interpretation of these rules and concepts is not a purely factual matter. What underlies this idea is Wittgenstein's argument about rule-following. There are semantic conventions of a language, as that "plus" means plus , and there are psychological regularities and dispositions of thinkers, as that the concept of "addition" applies to the activity of adding , and these are facts, but there are no further rules, no further conventions, and indeed no facts about the correct application of rules or concepts, to which judgments about what it is correct to say or or to think should correspond. This is why "following a rule" is not itself a rule or an interpretation: there are no rules for rule-following, no interpretation of interpretations. In this sense, rules are not norms, although instructions about how to follow rules carry norms (a rule is a fact, although following a rule is not a fact). These norms or correctness conditions, according to this line of thought, do exist and are objective-Wittgenstein is not proposing a sceptical view about them -but that they exist and are objective is not a fact in the world, a fact about the speakers dispositions, or a species of "superfact" about norms as platonic entities. 3 A central tenet of this view is that these specific norms for meanings and concepts can only be assessed communally, by speakers and thinkers who must be able to conform to public normative standards.
If we take this sort of view seriously, these interpretative or intellectual norms are distinctive. They are not practical nor epistemic per se , in the sense that they would bear directly on what one ought to do or to believe, or on what one has reasons to do or to believe. This is why implications (1) and (2) . One says that these norms are specific , in the sense that they are attached to each particular expression in a language, or to each concept in a thinker's psychology, or perhaps to each kind of expression or each kind of concept. Thus there are specific norms for words like "cat", "plus", "arthtritis" or "sofa", or for the concept of addition..This does not imply that these norms correspond to necessary and sufficient conditions of applications of the words or concepts. It comes close to Wittgenstein's view, at least one one familiar interpretation, that there are "criteria", possibly defeasible ones, for the use of words and concepts. Such specific norms do entail, on this view, which one might call particularist , normative judgments to the effect that if one's community or society uses a certain word to mean a certain thing, then one must use that word with that meaning. But such normative judgments do not have any compulsory impact. We have the choice to interpret someone who uses the word "arthritis" as meaning a disease of the joints or as meaning a disease of the muscles. The fact that an individual uses a word with a different meaning than the standard one does not prevent us to interpret him.
This contrasts with an other view, according to which the interpretative norms are not specific to particular kinds of words or concepts, but are general, and pertain to highly abstract, context-free, standards of thought. Thus on Davidson's view of interpretation, there are certain gobal rationality requirements for a correct interpretation of speech and thought -such as the requirement that an individual's beliefs be by an large true and coherent. A similar claim is pervasive in Dennett's writings about the "intentional stance". 5 Such general normative principles are situated at a higher level than the level of specific kinds of meanings or concepts, since they register norms for the use of any sort of meaning or concept, and indeed of the very "conditions of thought" in general. Unlike the specific norms, they are compulsory, in the sense that a speaker or a thinker would not be a speaker or a thinker if he were not interpretable through the use of such rationality requirements. Such a generalist view, as we may call it, is well expressed in Mc Dowell's comments upon Davidson's claim that there is "a constitutive ideal of rationality" which shapes of thought about propositional attitudes :
"To recognize the ideal status of the constitutive concept is to appreciate that the concepts of propositional attitudes have their proper home in explanations of a special sort: explanations in which things are made intelligible by being revealed to be, or to approximate to being, as they rationally ought to be [my
. This is to be contrasted with a style of explanation in which one makes things intelligible by representing their coming into being as a particular instance of how things generally tend to happen." 6 Although this "rational ought" operates at a much higher level than the particular "oughts" which go with the "specific constraints" on meanings and concepts that it does not have to presuppose the existence of specific rules or conventions which would have a normative force of their own . 7 But it must obey certain general constraints which are independent from the specific constraints of words and concepts, in which cannot be facts about individuals. Interpretations record facts. But normative principles about interpretation, such as the principle of charity, are not themselves facts. The reason why they are not facts is that they cannot be made precise in the way facts could be made precise. If they could be made precise, the standards of rationality could be codified, in such a way that the patterns of oughts derivable from an ascription of thought could always be specified. For instance one could say that someone who believes that cats are furred ought to believe that animals are furred. But acording to Davidson no such specification is to be had. In other terms: there are norms of rationality, with respect to which one can assess contents, but there are no norms of norms of rationality, no "super-norms" against which rationality itself could be assessed. 8 We can now see what is wrong with (1) where a "rational ought" occurs in the antecedent. 9 If such conditionals are valid, then the normative features of meanings and mental content are not direct and intrinsic to them , but indirect and relational, and doubly so: they are relative both to the ascriptions and interpretations of meanings and contents, and to the particular norms or correctness conditions for these ascriptions and interpretations. This removes partly the worry expressed above, that norms for meaning and content could figure categorically in meaning and thoughts. They figure in them only hypothetically.That I believe that p is a fact, but that I have reasons to believe that p is not itself a fact.
One, however, may welcome the conclusion that normativity is not a genuine, but a derivative, feature of contents, or that it is relative to an ascriber or . Brandom presents his work as an attempt to explain why meaning and thought are normative.
He combines most explicitly the themes which we have distinguished above. Here he advocates a form of conceptual or inferential role semantics (95-116). He holds, further that there is no way to sort out the formal inferences that are based on logical concepts, such as conjunction and disjunction, from the material inferences based on non logical concepts, such as "cat" or "animal" (125-137). To know the meaning of an expression, and to be able to use a concept is to be able to grasp these inferential relations.
From these claims various consequences follow, which, according to him, allow us to give a full-blooded sense to the claim that content has a normative character .
An implication of the generalist theme above is that to conceive of a subject as interpretable at all, and to ascribe to her meanings and thought contents, is to conceive this subject as a rational being. But the purely interpretationist view takes this rationality to flow from the "normative" principles of interpretation, which are instrumental in making sense of an individual. It denies (at least in Dennett's version) that there has to be any real states of the individual which instantiate the normative principles.
Brandom rejects this (55-62): the intentionality and the rationality of a creature is not a merely derived or as if intentionality and rationality, but a genuine, original one. But this does not mean that it can be made sense of apart from anyone taking the states of the individuals as contentful (60).
According to Brandom, the intentionality and rationality of content is both derivative and objective: it derives from "the implicit practical taking of states, The second consequence is that meanings (and hence thought contents) are instituted by the linguistic practices. It is these practices which account for their "normative" character: they give rise to certain sorts of regularities of uses, and to sanctions for those who do not follow these uses.
One might be tempted, here, to reduce these norms and rules to regularities to take also this attitude, the attitude which the interpreter identifies in others and the ones that he takes himself, must be the same attitude. But is it the same? We may agree, prima facie, that two speakers who converse share certain norms and attitudes towards these norms, in Brandom's sense. But does it follow that an external observer of the conversation has to share the attitudes that she attributes?
Certainly the observer must be able to share, in some sense, the contents which he ascribes. But it is a different, and a stronger claim, to say that the interpreter must himself take a normative attitude, and share the normative attitude that he ascribes. Suppose, for instance that I understand that you are strongly committed to creationism. I may understand that you are, through the understanding of some statements of yours, such as "Darwin was wrong", "God created the species", and Maybe Brandom has in mind something much weaker than the idea that an interpreter must endorse, or be committed to the deontic attitudes of speakers.
Sometimes he just seems to imply that the interpreter must recognize that someone who said that p is making an assertion, and that assertion is the normal expression of belief. But then talk of norms reduces to talk of rules, in the more descriptive sense of regularity and normality , and not in any prescriptive or evaluative sense. So why should we need a stronger sense of "norm"? I don't see that we need such a stronger sense, in the sense in which a norm is understood as an imperative, or as entailing an ought statement. So the theorist of the normativity of meaning is committing here the fallacy denounced above, of deriving a categorical "ought" from a derived one.
The normative character of a content, therefore, is not a direct property of the content itself, but a property which derives from the attitudes that one has taken towards the content, about the way it is proper to assess it, to assert it, or to think of it rationnally. It is a feature of a reflexive attitude that we take towards our own propositional attitudes and their content, but it is not lodged in these attitudes and contents. Brandom is right to say that the norms of the mental come from the normative or deontic attitudes that we take towards our own thoughts. But it does not follow that contents are themselves "normative". In most cases, we simply have the thoughts, without thereby having normative stances towards them. The normativity becomes a property of the thoughts and of their implications only at a later stage, when we reflect upon them. But it remains to be seen how this can happen.
III. NORMATIVITY AND SELF-ASCRIPTIONS
I can only give here the outline of an account of the source of our normative attitudes. I have just suggested that it has to do with our capacity to be reflective about our own thoughts: we are able to know what thoughts we have, that is to self-ascribe them to ourselves. Self-knowledge of one own contents of thought depends upon having second-order beliefs about the contents of our beliefs, of the form "I believe that I believe that p ", but it does not simply consist in our having such second-order beliefs, for these second-order beliefs have also to be knowledge. As many writers have noticed, there is a sort of immunity of selfascriptions of thoughts, to the effect that we are always correct in ascribing them to ourselves, even on the externalist hypothesis their content is determined by our social, or our physical environment. 15 In other terms, we are always entitled to ascribe beliefs contents to ourselves, even when the contents themselves are
erroneous. But what is the source of this entitlement?
In recent papers, Burge 16 has claimed that self-knowledge of our own attitudes, as expressed in such statements as: "I judge, herewith, that there are physical entities" are "contextually self-verifying", i.e are always true in all contexts. He locates the entitlement that we have to such statements in two sources: 1) the role of relevant judgments in critical reasoning, and 2) the constitutive relation between the judgments and their subject matter 17 . 1) is the essential source, for Burge, but it is closely tied to (2) . It means, according to him that "To be capable of critical reasoning, and to be the subject of certain rational norms necessarily associated with such reasoning, some states must be knowledgeably reviewable. The specific character of this knowledgeable reviewability requires that it be associated with an epistemic commitment that is distinctive." ( ibid. 98)
In other terms, for Burge, there is a "constitutive" link between being a rational inquirer, who commits himself to certain norms of critical reasoning, and his epistemically responsible for his beliefs and inferences, and the possibility of being able to review one's thoughts knowledgeably. As he says:
"The first person point of view bears a distinctive relation to the relevance of rational norms to rational activity. For a review of a propositional mental event or state to yield an immediate rational ground to defend or alter the attitude, the point of view of the review and of the attitude reviewed must be the same and must be first personal." (ibid. 115) Such a view is quite compatible with the conclusion that we have reached above: in order for there to be a normative element in a thought content entertained by a subject, the subject must be able to take a stance towards his own thoughts, that is to assess them as rational. What Burge adds is that this goes necessarily with the capacity of a subject to know about what she thinks, in a secure way. His claim is that the role of self-ascriptions in critical reasoning the source of a thinker's entitlement to make them, so that it is a precondition of this entitlement to self-knowledge that the subject can conceive of herself as a rational inquirer, subject to epistemic norms.
This view, however, comes quite close to Brandom's view, if we add with
Brandom that in order to be a rational inquirer, capable of normative attitudes towards his own thoughts one must be embedded in a social context of public assessment of one's claims. Whatever line one takes on this matter, Burge's conception is problematic, because he excludes the possibility that the source of our entitlement to self knowledge might be a psychological capacity that we could have independently of its role in critical reasoning. On Burge's view, one needs to have attitudes about one's own attitudes in order to be able of critical reasoning.
But we can doubt that the normative element in mental content arises only at this level. There may be more primitive capacities of reasoning, which involve assessment or support, without the subject having the concept of a propositional attitude or being able to "review" them. Suppose, for instance that someone comes back home and sees that his spouse's car is not in the driveway, who believes on the basis of this information that his wife is not home yet, but then suspends this belief on the basis of his remembering that she may have taken the car to the garage for repair, and as a result of that believes that she is at home. As
Peacocke notes about such an example, "nothing in this little fragment of reasoning seems to involve the self ascription of belief." 18 The existence of a normative element in mental content does not need, therefore, to be only a feature of our self-ascriptions of thought: this element can be, so to say, prepared by more primitive psychological capacites that the taking of normative epistemic attitudes towards our thoughts. It remains true that most of the "normativity" that is present is due to our reflexive attitudes as critical reasoners, without being a feature of contents themselves. But this is not incompatible with the idea that the more primitive capacities of assessment of thought contents have a causal character in the formation of such normative epistemic attitudes. If this is so, there is no reason to think that we cannot explain, in some psychological sense, the kinds of attitudes that give rise to the normative element in mental contents, and thus that, contrary to what Brandom and others say, it is not "norms all the way down".
I have tried to sort out the various senses in which we could talk of the normativity of meaning and thought. I have argued that when this normativity is said to be a feature of our interpretations, it is not obvious that there is anything prescriptive about the thoughts themselves. I have tried to
show that when there is an authentic normative dimension in thought contents, it is not a direct and categorical feature of these contents, but a feature which springs from our attitudes as would-be rational inquirers and which is conditional upon the existence of such attitudes. I have also suggested that these attitudes are based upon our capacity of self knowledge of our own thoughts, but I have allowed that this kind of self-knowledge is not necessary for the existence of normative liaisons in contents. 
